The problem of security in vehicular networks is a vital issue and attracts researchers' increasing attention for its unique characteristics, such as the vulnerability of wireless media, untrusted communication environment, and closely relationship with human lives and privacy. Authentication is an effective means to ensure the security of communication and provide trust. Authorized vehicle should be revoked if the vehicle become compromised. Designing an efficient revocation mechanism for vehicular networks is a challenging task because of the diverse security requirements and the unique network characteristics. Thus, a large body of work emerged in recent years, proposing revocation schemes tailored to vehicular networks. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey on revocation schemes in vehicular networks. Firstly, we investigate existing revocation schemes systematically and classify these schemes based on the location where the revocation information has been placed. Secondly, we divide the whole revocation process into three stages: 1) the resolution of revocation information, 2) the distribution of revocation information and 3) the use of revocation information. Typical works in each stage of the revocation process have been reviewed and we also point out the challenging problems and key enabled techniques in each stage.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the convergence of transportation industry and Information and Communication Technology (ICT), vehicle in the future will have strong communication capacities, which can improve travel efficiency and reduce traffic accidents. The use of wireless media makes the communications between vehicles vulnerable [1] . In addition, the communication environment in vehicular networks is not trusted as the two parties participating the communication may be unfamiliar with each other [2] , [3] . Furthermore, with the development of edge computing paradigms, concepts of vehicular cloud computing [4] and vehicular fog computing [5] have been put forward. In these novel scenarios, vehicles are asked to fulfill tasks collaboratively [6] . In vehicular fog computing, vehicles can be utilized as infrastructure to provide better services, such as enabling real-time traffic management [7] . The security problems caused by the vulnerable communication media and the untrusted network may pose greater challenges The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Junhui Zhao . to vehicular cloud/fog computing [8] , [9] . Therefore, it is necessary for vehicular networks to provide adequate security ability before deploying into the real-world [10] - [12] .
Authentication is an effective means to ensure the security of communication. In the process of communication, vehicle proves its legality by providing valid certificate, which is issued by certificate authority. There exists one case in which vehicle has obtained the valid certificate from certificate authority but becomes compromised before the expire date. In this case, the compromised vehicle can communication with others normally, so it can attack other vehicle or broadcasts false messages. To prevent the compromised vehicle jeopardizing the network, the issued certificate to the vehicle should be made invalid. The whole process of making invalid an issued certificate of the compromised vehicle is called revocation. The process of certificate revocation is the inverse of the process of certificate issuance.
It's a challenging task to design an efficient revocation mechanism for vehicular networks. Firstly, complex security requirements are needed in vehicular networks. The vehicle hopes that it can identify the authenticity of receiving VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ messages while the sender of the message hopes to protect its privacy. And the privacy-preservation should be conditional in case that malicious attacker sends false message. These complex requirements will have effect on revocation mechanisms. Secondly, the highly dynamic network topology leads to vulnerable connectivity [13] . However, the vehicle wishes to obtain the latest revocation information as timely as possible such that it can minimize the risk of being attacked by the compromised vehicle. Lastly, vehicular networks are delay-sensitive networks and high delay may cause severe traffic accidents. So it is necessary to take the delay constraint into account when design revocation mechanism. To deal with these challenges, a wide variety of revocation schemes have been proposed. Now it is necessary to do works to summarize or review the state-of-the-art of revocation schemes in vehicular networks. So far, the summary or review on revocation schemes in vehicular networks only appear in surveys on security and privacy schemes. In [14] , Petit et al. surveyed pseudonym schemes in vehicular networks. In the survey, authors propose an abstract pseudonym lifecycle, including issuance, use, change, resolution, and revocation. The survey covers pseudonym schemes based on the public key, identity-based cryptography, group signatures and symmetric authentication. In the proposed lifecycle, the revocation phase is optional. This survey pays more attention on group signature based revocation schemes. In [15] , Boualouache et al. focus on pseudonym changing strategies and revocation is just mentioned. To avoid overlap with existing surveys, Lu et al. [16] have reported the latest advances in VANETs including security, pseudonym authentication scheme, location privacy and trust management. In the survey, the revocation of pseudonym certificates is mentioned by summarizing several existing revocation schemes briefly. Qu et al. [11] reviewed authentication methods and privacy-preserving methods in the paper. The privacy-preserving methods are divided into three categories: group signature based schemes, pseudonym based schemes and hybrid schemes. The revocation problem only mentioned in signature based schemes. In [17] , Ali et al. classified several authentication and privacy schemes into four categories. For each category, schemes are evaluated qualitatively in terms of the fulfilled security requirements, the controlled security attacks, the communication and computing overheads. In the survey, the revocation problems are mentioned in several schemes but they are not given more attentions.
Although there are a few surveys focusing on revocation schemes in vehicular networks, the investigations are not comprehensive. To deal with different scenarios in vehicular networks, Raya et al. [18] developed three certificate revocation protocols: Revocation using Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists (RC 2 RL), Revocation of the Tamper-Proof Device (RTPD) and Distributed Revocation Protocol (DRP). And authors evaluated the performance of these revocation protocols. In [19] , Falasi et al. provided an overview of the revocation research in VANETs before the year of 2011. According to the difference of revocation decision mechanism, revocation schemes are divided into centralized schemes and decentralized schemes. Authors also compare the different revocation schemes using six evaluation criterion. Khan et al. [20] summarized existing revocation distribution techniques and protocols in VANETs.
Different from existing surveys on revocation, in this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey on revocation schemes in vehicular networks. Firstly, we investigate existing revocation schemes systematically and classify these schemes based on the location where the revocation information has been placed. Secondly, we divide the whole revocation process into three stages: 1) the resolution of revocation information, 2) the distribution of revocation information and 3) the use of revocation information. We review the typical works in each stage of the revocation process and point out the challenges and enabled techniques in each stage. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first time to provide a comprehensive and systematical survey that focus specially on revocation schemes in vehicular networks. This survey aims at providing an overview of the different researches and approaches for revocation schemes in vehicular networks, and serving as a basis for designing more efficient and effective revocation mechanisms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, some necessary background information is provided. Existing revocation schemes in vehicular networks are classified based on the entity where the revocation checking happens in Section III. In Section IV, we divided the revocation process into three stages and the typical works in each stage are introduced elaborated. Finally, Section V concludes the survey.
II. BACKGROUND
Revocation schemes in vehicular networks are influenced by the unique characteristics of vehicular networks. In this section, some useful information is provided, which can help the reader to understand the paper.
A. OVERVIEWS OF VEHICULAR NETWORKS
In vehicular networks, there are two main communication modes: Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I). By V2V mode, vehicles can exchange information including safety messages, alert messages or entertainment information. Vehicle can access to the Internet by V2I. The vehicle can gather the road condition information and report to the traffic management departments. And vehicle can also download any information via the infrastructure. The bands at 5.85-5.925 GHz of the wireless spectrum have been allocated to vehicular networks for V2V and V2I communications [21] . As the high-bandwidth multimedia applications increase, the spectrum scarcity problem becomes more evident in vehicular networks [22] , [23] . The cognitive radio technology can improve spectrum efficiency by use spectrum opportunistically, which can act as an enable technology to alleviate the spectrum scarcity problem in vehicular networks [24] - [26] . The multi-band cooperation or extra bandwidth allocation can also be an alternative solution for the spectrum scarcity problem [27] , [28] .
The vehicular networks are characterized by quasipermanent mobility, high speeds, and very short connection times [10] . On the one hand, these characteristics lead to unstable connectivity, which will have impacts on the distribution of revocation information. On the other hand, vehicle moves with high speed and high latency may cause severe consequences. The design of revocation mechanism for vehicular networks should take these characteristics into consideration.
B. SECURITY THREATS AND REQUIREMENTS
In vehicular networks, driver may make decision according to the messages broadcasted by the surrounding vehicles. False messages will lead to wrong decision and cause traffic accidents. So the authenticity of the message source and the data integer should be checked before the use of the message [29] . Some adversaries may track vehicle location or monitor trajectories of targeted vehicle by the broadcasted messages [10] . To protect the privacy of the vehicle, vehicle should broadcast messages anonymously. However, the privacy-preservation should be conditional [30] , [31] . If some vehicles broadcast false messages intentionally to obtain more road rights, the traffic enforcement agencies should be able to trace these vehicles. The security requirements for vehicular networks are summarized as follows:
• Authenticity. The message receiving vehicle should be able to verify the legitimacy of the source of the message. The receiver should be also able to verify whether the received message has been forged or modified.
• Anonymity. The receiver of the message should not be able to obtain the identity of the sender from the message. It is also required that the receiving vehicle cannot distinguish whether two messages are sent by the same vehicle. It can prevent vehicle being tracked by malicious attackers.
• Traceability. The trusted authority or traffic enforcement authority should have the ability to reveal the identity of the compromised vehicle from the signature of the message sent by the compromised vehicle. And the compromised vehicle should not deny the revealing results.
C. AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES IN VEHICULAR NETWORKS
In vehicular networks, authentication schemes should provide the capacities of authenticity, anonymity and traceability. According to the cryptography techniques used in the process of authentication, authentication schemes can be divided into three categories: PKI certificate based, symmetric key based, and group signature based. For authentication schemes that base on PKI certificate and symmetric key, extra measures are adopted to satisfy the all security requirements in vehicular networks.
For PKI certificate based authentication schemes, the capacities of authenticity and traceability are provided by the PKI certificate itself. The message receiver can check the legitimacy of the sender by verifying the certificate. The sender can also be traced by others using the certificate. Pseudonym mechanisms [14] , [15] are proposed to provide anonymity capacity. The vehicle is issued a lot of short-lived pseudonyms certificates to conceal its real identity. The traceability is guaranteed by the mapping relationships of permanent identity and pseudonyms, which are stored in certificate authority.
In symmetric key based authentication schemes [32] , [33] , only authorized vehicles are issued the key. Other than providing the authorization information, the key does not provide any other information. Therefore, the capacity of anonymity is provided. To providing the capacity of tracing the compromised vehicle, extra information that can identify the sender should be added to the message. Certainly, measures should also be adopted to ensure that the identity information is visible to the certificate but invisible to other vehicles.
Group signature [34] , [35] can provide all three capacities for authentication schemes in vehicular networks. The group public key is shared among all group members, which can be used to verify the signature generated by each group member with its secret key. Only the group manager can open the signature and identify the vehicle who generates the signature. Shortcomings for group signature based scheme are high overheads in authentication process.
D. REVOCATION IN VEHICULAR NETWORKS
When a certificate is issued to user, the certificate is valid before the expiration date. In some circumstances, such as key compromised, affiliation change, or superseded [36] , the certificate is hoped to be invalid before it expires. The Certificate Authority (CA) can revoke the certificate by adding it to the Certificate Revocation List (CRL). So far, there are two main revocation method: CRL [36] and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [37] .
Besides authentication schemes based on certificate, there are some authentication schemes that depend on other cryptographic mechanisms, such as symmetric key. In fact, any approaches that prevent the compromised vehicles generating further harms to vehicular networks can be deemed as revocation mechanisms. The revocation mechanism for vehicular networks should take into consideration three goals in the following:
• The revocation information should be distributed to vehicles as soon as possible, i.e., the revocation vulnerability window [38] , [39] should be small.
• The overheads caused by revocation information distribution should be as low as possible.
• The usage of revocation information should be as efficient as possible. It is better that the revocation checking process does not cause high latency. The revocation scheme in vehicular networks is closely related to authentication scheme. For PKI certificate-based authentication scheme, the compromised vehicle can be revoked by distributing CRL in which the certificate of the compromised vehicle is included. For symmetric key based authentication scheme, it can revoke the compromised vehicle by updating the keys of all vehicles other than the compromise vehicle. For group signature based authentication scheme, both CRL distribution and key update are available for revoking the compromised vehicle [40] .
III. REVOCATION SCHEMES IN VEHICULAR NETWORKS
Generally, three types of entity are involved in revocation schemes for vehicular networks, as is shown in Fig.1 .
• Certificate Authority (CA): CA is assumed to be trusted and responsible for certificate issuance and identity resolution. To provide more strong capacity of protecting privacy, CA may be constituted by several sub-authorities [41] - [43] . For example, long terms certificate authority, pseudonym authority and resolution authorities together constitute the trusted authorities.
• Intermediate Authority (IA): In general, IA undertakes two tasks: the distribution of revocation information and region management. RSU play the role of IA for the majority of revocation schemes in vehicular networks. In some distributed revocation scheme, RSUs are managed by some Regional Authorities (RA). These regional authorities are also assigned to IA.
• Vehicle: Vehicle is the communication entity and service object for all revocation schemes. Vehicle can communicate with other vehicles by V2V and can access the RSU by V2I. Revocation information is the information that can be used to determine whether a vehicle has been revoked. In general, there are two methods to indicate revocation information: black list and white list. The black list is the list that includes the information of all revoked vehicles. The white list includes the information of all non-revoked vehicles. The representation of revocation information depends on the authentication scheme. For certificate-based authentication scheme, revocation information is represented using certificate that has been issued to vehicle. For symmetric key-based authentication scheme, the identity of vehicle is used to represent revocation information. CRL is the most common revocation information that includes certificates of all revoked vehicles.
In vehicular networks, revocation information can be placed on any one of the three entity to achieve the revocation goals. The revocation information can be placed on CA, such as OCSP [37] . The IA can store the revocation information to implement revocation. The most common revocation schemes are distributing revocation information to vehicle and revocation is achieved locally.
There are many certificate revocation schemes in vehicular networks. According to the entity where the revocation information is placed, revocation schemes can be divided into three categories: CA-based, IA-based, and vehicle-based. There are some problems when the revocation information is stored in CA, such as latency and scalability, which is not suit for vehicular networks. The majority of revocation schemes in vehicular networks are based on IA or vehicle. Table 1 shows the comparison among different revocation approaches for vehicular networks. Some other schemes are also proposed to implement revocation, which is different from above three categories.
A. IA-BASED REVOCATION APPROACH
Revocation schemes that implement revocation checking in IA can be divided into two cases. For the first case, revocation checking proceeds in the stage of certificates updating. For the second case, whenever a vehicle receives a new message, the vehicle will send request to IA and query the revocation status of the message sender.
1) CHECKING WHEN UPDATING CERTIFICATES OR KEYS
To protect privacy, many authentication schemes employ pseudonyms certificate with short lifetime. When the certificate expires, vehicle will update the certificate with the help of IA. The IA will refuse to issue certificate to those vehicles appearing in CRL.
Laurendeau et al. [44] proposed a protocol to secure anonymous broadcasting in vehicular networks. In the proposed scheme, authors used a hybrid key infrastructure approach to manage devices in vehicular networks. Devices in this approach are divided into two categories: anonymous devices, and trusted devices. Anonymous devices refer to vehicles owned by private citizens and commercial organizations, while trusted devices may include RSUs, buses, police car, ambulance, etc. Anonymous devices employ network authorization key to guarantee secure and anonymous safety message broadcasting. The network authorization key is a symmetric key and shared among the authorized members of the network. The key is issued by CA and have limited lifetime. Whenever the key expires, the device must request CA for a new key. In the scheme, CA functions as IA and is responsible for revoking misbehaving device. The CA only allows the normal devices to update network authorization key to achieve key revocation. For trusted devices, PKI certificates are used to secure communications and certificate revocation is implemented by CRL (similar to revocation scheme in III-B).
Studer et al. [45] proposed a key management scheme, named Temporary Anonymous Certified Keys (TACKs). In Tacks, Region Authority (RA) acts as IA and issues temporary certificates to vehicles. Vehicle uses these short-lived temporary certificates to secure communications. Managing authority distributes CRL to RA and revocation checking happens in RA. When vehicle updates its temporary certificate, RA will check whether the vehicle is in CRL. If the vehicle appears in CRL, RA will not issue new temporary certificate to the vehicle. In TACKs, group signature mechanism is used in the communication between vehicle and RA to prevent RA tracking vehicle. CRL stores the revocation tokens of the revoked vehicles. For group signature, the revocation checking cost is very expensive. Authors in TACKs propose use the scheme of Boneh et al. [53] for efficient revocation check. However, the efficient revocation is at the cost of reduced anonymity [53] .
Shao et al. [46] proposed a threshold anonymous authentication protocol, in which RSU was selected as IA. Communication between vehicle and RSU uses PKI certificate to implement authentication. Communication among vehicles employs group signature to ensure security. In the proposed scheme, Tracing Manager (TM) is responsible for resolving the identity of compromised vehicle and distributing CRL to RSU. TM also issue PKI certificate to vehicle. RSU uses CRL generated by TM to implement revocation checking. Whenever vehicle enters the communication range of a new RSU, the vehicle will request group certificate from RSU by providing valid PKI certificate. Once receiving request, RSU will verify the validity of the PKI certificate. If the PKI certificate provided by vehicle appears in the CRL, RSU will refuse to issue group certificate to the vehicle. Vehicle that does not own group certificate will be unable to participate the normal communication with other vehicles.
There exist security problems for revocation mechanisms in above schemes. In these schemes, IA implement revocation by refusing to provide new certificates or keys. Vehicle will not update its certificate or key until the old certificate or key expires. That is, the compromised vehicle can still employ the old certificate or key to communication with other vehicle before the old certificate or key become invalid.
2) CHECKING WHEN RECEIVING NEW MESSAGE
Whenever vehicle receives new message, vehicle needs to determine whether the sender of the message has been revoked. Vehicle sends certificate information of the sender to IA and IA is responsible for the revocation check. Once the revocation checking finishes, the IA will response vehicle with the revocation status of the message sender. This approach of revocation checking is perplexed by scalability and latency. There are numerous vehicles in vehicular networks and each vehicle generates message with extremely high frequency. To response enormous requests in limited time, it poses huge challenge to IA. latency introduced by communicating, queuing and revocation checking in this approach is also an important problem because of the characteristics of latency-sensitive.
Zhang et al. [47] proposed a decentralized groupauthentication protocols to deal with the scalability problem. In the proposed scheme, RSU implements the function of IA. Each RSU manages an on-the-fly group and vehicles situated in the communication range of the RSU are group members. Group signature are employed in vehicle-to-vehicle communication. The communication between vehicle and RSU is protected by signcryption mechanism, which ensures that vehicle can securely obtain the secret member key from RSU. In the decentralized scheme, the task of group management is undertaken by all RSUs in the network and each RSU only manages vehicles in its communication range, so the system will have strong capacity and be scalable.
In [48] , Fernandez et al. proposed an efficient revocation management scheme by using the data structure of dynamic hash tree. In the proposed scheme, Trusted Third Party (TTP) generates CRL and distributes the CRL to RSU (acts as IA). Vehicle sends request to RSU and query on the validity of the pseudonym certificate. This approach makes TTP no longer a bottleneck and is more scalable. The k-array hash tree is used as Authentication Data Structure(ADS) to store CRL. In ADS, the revoked certificates are placed in the leaf nodes of the hash tree. The use of hash tree in revocation management can improve the efficiency of querying and updating the revoked certificates.
B. VEHICLE-BASED REVOCATION APPROACH
In vehicular networks, vehicle is the main body for communication. It is the most common revocation approach that VOLUME 8, 2020 vehicle itself is responsible for revocation checking. In this approach, revocation information, is distributed by CA to vehicle. Whenever receiving a new message, vehicle will judge whether the sender of the message is revoked by searching CRL locally. If the certificate of the message sender appears in CRL, vehicle will know the sender has been revoked and will not accept the message. Many authentication schemes use this approach to implement certificate revocation [49] , which is also the revocation approach for IEEE WAVE protocols [50] . To implementing this revocation approach, it is imperative to design two mechanisms. First, it's necessary to design efficient revocation information distribution mechanisms, which is especially important for vehicular network. The reason is that vehicle may move in high speed. In addition, vehicle may not always connect with the network because of the sparsity of RSU deployment. Second, efficient revocation checking mechanisms are needed.
Ganan et al. [51] proposed an efficient and privacy-aware revocation mechanism. To prevent leaking private information in the process of revocation checking, the Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [54] was used to implement revocation checking. Revocation information is distributed to vehicles and revocation happens in vehicles. MHT stores revocation information and each leaf node in MHT is a hash value of revoked certificate. CA uses CRL to generate MHT and distributes the root hash value of MHT to all vehicles. In the proposed scheme, each pseudonym certificate need a no-invalid proof. The proof includes the paths of two adjacent leaf nodes in MHT. The proof is calculated by RSU and vehicle needs to request the proof from RSU. Revocation checking can be implemented by using the root hash value and the no-invalid proof. When a vehicle sends a message, it will include its pseudonym certificate and no-invalid proof into the message. If another vehicle receives the message, it will verify the validity of the pseudonym certificate. First, it calculates the hash value of the pseudonym certificate and verify that the hash value is between the two hash values. These two hash value is provided by the sender and includes in no-invalid proof. Then it verifies that the two hash values are two adjacent leaf nodes. Lastly, it calculates the root hash value and verify whether the value is equal to the root hash value obtained from the CA. The pseudonym certificate will be deemed as unrevoked if it passes all above verifications. Moreover, to further preserve the privacy of vehicle, a crowds-based anonymous protocol was also proposed to update the no-invalid proof in the proposed scheme.
In [52] , Wasef et al. proposed an Expedite Message Authentication Protocol (EMAP) by using the keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [55] . In EMAP, the key used in generating the HMAC is shared only among unrevoked vehicles. Once receiving a message, vehicle will use the key to verify the message. If the message passes the verification, the sender of the message is not revoked vehicle; otherwise, the sender is revoked. Revocation checking in EMAP is implemented by this approach. The most important problem for enabling this approach is how to ensure that only the normal vehicles can obtain the key and the revoked vehicle cannot. A probabilistic key distribution mechanism was proposed to solve the problem. Trusted Authority (TA) generates plenty of PKI key pairs which are used to prevent the revoked vehicles obtaining the key used for HMAC. TA will select randomly fixed number of key pairs and distribute the selected key pairs to all vehicle. If the HMAC key needs to update, TA will select one key pair that shared by the majority of vehicles other than the revoked vehicles. Then TA encrypts the information necessary for generating HMAC key and distributes the encrypted information and CRL to all vehicles. The revoked vehicles will not decrypt the information and thus cannot obtain the HMAC key.
C. OTHER REVOCATION APPROACHES
Besides the revocation schemes above, some other approaches were proposed to revoke compromised vehicles, such as white list approach, hybrid approach. we will introduce these scheme in the following.
CRL is a black list that stores the certificates of revoked vehicles, while the certificates of normal vehicles can form a white list. Tan et al. [56] proposed a Secure and Authenticated Key Management Protocol (SA-KMP), in which white list is employed to implement the revocation of compromised vehicles. In SA-KMP, symmetric keys are used to secure the communications for V2V and V2I. Before the communication starts, key negotiation is needed between the two sides of the communication. In the proposed scheme, RSU is responsible for key negotiation. And PKI certificate is used to secure the process of key negotiation. The PKI certificate is issued by Regional Transport Authority (RTA). RTA uses Vehicle Public File Directory (VPFD) to store all vehicles' public key. The VPFD is maintained by RTA in real-time and RTA distributes the read-only copy of VPFD to all RSUs. If some vehicles are revoked, RTA will delete the public keys of these vehicles from the VPFD and update the VPFD in RSU simultaneously. In SA-KMP, the VPFD play the role of white list. RSU refuses to provide negotiation service for the vehicles whose public key do not appear in VPFD. As a result, revoked vehicles cannot obtain the symmetric key and thus cannot communication with others.
For authentication schemes based on group signature, there are two revocation approaches: 1) updating the group secret keys of all vehicles except for the revoked ones [57] ; 2) distributing CRL to vehicles [46] , [47] . The first approach may introduce high overheads especially when the number of the group member is huge. For the second approach, revocation checking process is time-consuming and the time grows linearly with the number of the revoked group members. Lin et al. [58] proposed a hybrid revocation scheme by combining these two approaches. In the proposed scheme, a predefined threshold T τ is introduced. When the number of the revoked vehicle in the CRL is less than T τ , the approach of distributing CRL is used. Otherwise, the approach of updating keys is employed. The hybrid revocation scheme can ensure lower revocation checking latency and reduce the frequency of key updating.
IV. REVOCATION PROCESS
The process of certificate revocation in vehicular networks consists of three stages: revocation information resolution, revocation information distribution and revocation information use. A lot of works have been done about these three stages. We will introduce the state-of-the-art for each stage in the following.
A. REVOCATION INFORMATION RESOLUTION
To protect the privacy of users in vehicular networks, vehicles communicate anonymously with others. To revoke a compromised vehicle permanently, it is necessary to resolve the real identity of the compromised vehicle from malicious messages or anonymous certificates.
The approaches for identity resolution are strongly dependent on the cryptographic mechanisms which are used to secure vehicular communications and preserve users' privacy. The cryptographic mechanisms that are employed in vehicular mainly include three categories: PKI pseudonym certificate, symmetric key, and group signature.
For basic authentication schemes that base on PKI pseudonym certificate, CA stores the mapping relationship between the identity of vehicle and the pseudonym certificate. CA can extract pseudonym certificate from the malicious message and resolve the identity of the compromised vehicle according to the mapping relationship. To make the certificate management more secure and trusted, Khodaei et al. [49] proposed an advanced identity and credential management scheme, named SECMACE. In SECMACE, multiple authorities are responsible for managing the credential together and the concept of tikect is introduced. The Long Term CA (LTCA) stores the identity of vehicle and long term certificate, and LTCA issue tickets to vehicles. Vehicle uses ticket to obtain pseudonym from the Pseudonym CA (PCA). Resolution Authorities (RA) is specially responsible for identity resolution. The resolution process consists of two stages. In the first stage, RA send request to PCA and obtain the ticket for the pseudonym certificate. In the second stage, RA send the obtained ticket to LTCA and LTCA responds with the long term certificate and the identity of the compromised vehicle.
In authentication schemes that use symmetric key, the key is same and shared in all authorized vehicles. The symmetric key cannot carry any information related to the vehicle identity. To trace and revoke compromised vehicles, it is necessary to add extra information about the sender to the message. To protect the privacy of the vehicle, the added information should be hard to obtain for other vehicles other than CA. In [44] , Laurendeau et al. proposed a secure and anonymous authentication protocols based on symmetric key mechanism. In the proposed scheme, there are two important entities, local CA and home CA. Home CA issue an identifier and a secret key to each legal vehicle. The secret key is used to generate signature and prove its identity. The identifier is used to trace the vehicle if the vehicle is compromised. Local CA is responsible for issue symmetric key and the public key itself to authorized vehicles. The symmetric key is used to secure communications and the public key is employed to encrypt the identifier. If a vehicle sends malicious message, the identity of the vehicle can be resolved by the cooperation of local CA and home CA.
Group signature can provide security, anonymity and traceability for vehicular communications by itself. The group manager issues group certificates to vehicles. The group public key and the secret key of the group member are included in the group certificate. Before vehicle sends a message, the secret key is used to sign the message. The signature of the message can be verified by group public key. The group manager undertakes the task of resolving identity of the compromised vehicles. The group manager stores the revocation token [53] for all vehicles, which are generated during the generation process of group certificates. If the group manager is provided a malicious message and its signature, it can resolve the identity of the message sender with the help of revocation tokens. Revocation schemes in [46] , [58] are based on this approach to implement identity resolution.
B. REVOCATION INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION
Once the identity resolution is accomplished, CA will add the certificate of revoked vehicle to CRL. Then, CA distributes CRL to vehicles to implement revocation checking. CRL distribution should be timely, i.e., if the compromised vehicle is identified, the revocation information should be distributed to vehicles as fast as possible. The revocation vulnerability window [39] should be as short as possible to reduce the harm caused by the revoked vehicle [59] . However, it will consume more bandwidth resource to distribute the CRL frequently. Typical schemes for efficient revocation information distribution are summarized in Table 2 .
1) AVAILABLE COMMUNICATION MODES FOR DISTRIBUTION
In vehicular networks, there are two basic communication modes, V2I and V2V, which can be used for CRL distribution. In addition, the capacity of multiple-channels communication can be also employed to improve the efficiency of CRL distribution.
In [70] , [72] , CRL is distributed to vehicles by RSU broadcasting, which is the most common approach for CRL distribution. In this approach, to ensure that vehicles can obtain fresh CRL timely, it is required that the deployment of the RSU should cover the whole vehicular networks.
For the roads in realistic world, the sparsity of RSU deployment may exist, especially in the early stage of vehicular networks. In [60] , [61] , both V2V and V2I communications are used to distribute CRL. First, CRL is broadcasted to vehicles by a small number of RSUs. The vehicle obtained CRL continues to broadcast CRL in a flooding fashion. In the proposed scheme, the speed and breadth of CRL distribution can be improved. In [61] , authors also study the problem of RSU placement to maximize the efficiency of CRL distribution by simulations.
The flooding protocols used by vehicle to distribute CRL may have impacts on distribution efficiency. In [74] , Kondareddy et al. analyzed the performance of seven flooding protocols. The metrics used to evaluate the protocols are 1) distribution time and 2) broadcasts per node. The distribution time is the time from the start to the end of distribution and broadcasts per node is the average number of broadcasts per node from the start to the end. The CRL distribution ends when 95% of the nodes in vehicular networks have received the CRL. According to the results of the analysis, the Neighbor Knowledge Broadcast is the best protocol with the low number of broadcasts and low distribution time at the cost of requiring to provide the CRL version information of all neighbor vehicles.
Instead of distributing CRL by flooding fashion, Chen et al. [62] proposed to use specific mobile nodes to distribute CRL to deal with the problem of the sparsity of RSU deployment. In the proposed scheme, areas that not are covered by RSU are called blind areas. The specify mobile nodes may be vehicles for public safety (e.g., police vehicles), or public transport (e.g., buses). These mobile nodes are used to cover the blind areas, which is modeled as an optimization problem. In the problem, the goal is to design optimal routes for mobile nodes and the constrains are delay and cost.
In addition, some works have been done to use cellular communication to distribute CRL. In [63] , Lequerica et al. proposed to employ existing cellular network technology, such as Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service (MBMS), to improve the efficiency of CRL distribution. In the proposed scheme, it is assumed that some vehicles can be equipped with a broadband cellular technology interface. CRL can be distributed to vehicle via this interface.
2) CRL OPERATIONS FOR EFFICIENT DISTRIBUTION
To make the CRL distribution more efficient, several approaches are introduced to vehicular networks for CRL distribution, such as delta CRL, coding techniques, bloom filters, and geographical distribution.
Delta-CRL [68] includes only changes since the last issued CRL, so it has less size than the full CRL. Distributing delta-CRL to vehicles can save bandwidth and thus improve the efficiency of distribution.
In vehicular networks, the communication links between V2V or V2I may interrupted frequently as vehicles move at high speed. And packet loss may happen in wireless communication environment, especially when the density of vehicles is high. These two factors make the distribution of CRL inefficient. The coding technique can provide resilience to disconnections and radio impairments [72] . Taking erasure codes [75] for example. First, the CRL file is segmented into M pieces. Then encoding these pieces into N pieces with the erasure codes. If vehicle receives any M out of N pieces, it can reconstruct the original CRL. That is to say few pieces are allowed to lost, which can improve the CRL distribution in unstable communication environment. The Raptor code [76] is a type of erasure codes, which has linear time encoding and decoding complexity and is capable of producing a large number of redundant file pieces. In [64] - [66] , Raptor code is used to encoding CRL file and thus improve the efficiency of CRL distribution in vehicular networks. When the channel contention happens, the vehicle with the most number of CRL file pieces will be selected to broadcast pieces [65] . Other coding technique can also be used to improve the efficiency. In [67] , Yamamoto et al. proposed a CRL distribution scheme by using random network coding [77] .
Bloom filter can be used to compress CRL, which can reduce the bandwidth requirements for CRL distribution [82] . In [38] , Rigazzi et al. proposed an optimal CRL distribution scheme based on bloom filter, in which result in a significant reduction of the size of CRL. Furthermore, as the number of revoked certificates increases, the size of the CRL in the proposed scheme can remain constant. The bloom filter is a probabilistic data structure and there is a chance of a false positive. Tuladhar et al. [69] use dual bloom filter to minimize the false positive rate. The dual bloom filter was first proposed by Rabieh et al. [83] to solve related problems in smart grid Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) networks.
The approach of geographical distribution is used to reduce the size of CRL in [63] , [69] - [73] . In these schemes, the whole vehicular networks are divided geographically into multiple small areas and each area is managed by a regional authority. As only the revoked vehicles appearing in the small region are added to CRL by regional authority, the size of CRL in the region can be reduced. The idea is that the number of revoked vehicles in each region is always less than the number of revoked vehicles in the whole networks. It is more efficient to distribute CRL with small size in each region.
C. REVOCATION INFORMATION USE
The revocation information is used to determine whether the sender of message has been revoked in the process of revocation checking. The latency performance of revocation checking is very important for revocation scheme, especially for revocation scheme in vehicular networks. Many works have been done to focus on improving the latency performance of revocation checking. The CRL checking latency is mainly influenced by two factors: 1) the data structure to store CRL and 2) the number of revoked certificates in CRL. Researchers have proposed many schemes to decrease the revocation checking latency by employing efficient authentication data structure or reducing the number of revoked certificates in CRL. Furthermore, the reason that the revocation checking latency is so important is that the process of revocation checking is coupled to the authentication process. Some works have been done to reduce the latency by separating the process of revocation checking from the authentication. The typical schemes that have been proposed to solve this problem are summarized in Table 3 . These schemes will be introduced in the following.
1) EFFECTIVE AUTHENTICATION DATA STRUCTURE
Linear search algorithm is the most common approach for CRL search. For the linear approach, the entry in the CRL is searched one by one from the beginning. Binary search algorithm can be also used for CRL search, but it requires that needs the revoked certificates in CRL store in a sorted mode.
Bloom filter [84] , a probabilistic data structure, is used in [61] to store CRL. By using bloom filter, the CRL checking latency can be reduced. But result of the checking has a small and configurable false positive rate, i.e., normal vehicle may be deemed as revoked vehicle with a low probability.
In [51] , a novel revocation mechanism based on Merkle Hash Tree [54] is proposed to replace the time-consuming CRL checking process. In the proposed scheme, revocation checking is implemented by multiple hash operations, instead of checking CRL in traditional revocation scheme. The revocation checking latency in the novel scheme can be approximately log N · T hash , in which N is the number of revoked vehicles in the networks, log N is the height of hash tree, and T hash is the time required by one hash operation. In [78] , Alrawais et al. also used Merkle Hash Tree to design efficient revocation scheme.
In [85] , the operation approach is also used to replace CRL search in the process of revocation check. In the scheme, Rabieh et al. [85] proposed to add a single trapdoor in the revocation list to implement certificate revocation. This approach can reduce CRL storage overhead and revocation checking delay in pseudonym-based vehicular networks.
2) THE NUMBER OF REVOKED CERTIFICATES IN CRL
The number of the revoked certificates in CRL is influenced by the lifetime of the certificate. If the certificate has longer lifetime, the number of the vehicles will increase. Nowatkowski et al. [79] proposed to reduce the CRL size by adding a ''valid after'' field to the WAVE certificate in IEEE Standard 1609.2 [50] , which can finally decrease the CRL checking latency.
The distributed authentication can also reduce the revocation checking latency. In [80] , Sun et al. proposed an efficient distributed key management scheme reduce revocation cost. In the scheme, the whole domain of the vehicular networks is divided into several sub-regions. The number of vehicles in each sub-region will be less than the number in the whole region. Therefore, the number of revoked in each sub-region can be reduced, which will make the revocation checking in sub-region more efficient. The distributed management of CRL can be enabled by emerging edge computing paradigms [86] , [87] .
In [81] , Crescenzo et al. proposed an efficient CRL search approach for vehicular networks. In the proposed scheme, the CRL checking time can be reduced to logarithmic in the number of revoked vehicles without violating the security and privacy properties. The main idea used in this scheme is the combination of common certificate validity time periods and local management of CRL pseudonym tags.
3) THE SEPARATION APPROACH
A novel revocation scheme is proposed to improve the performance of revocation checking. In [52] , the timeconsuming CRL checking process is replaced by symmetric key updating, which allows the process of revocation checking is separated from the message authentication process.
This separation mechanism allows the latency performance of revocation check will not influence message authentication. Thus the goal of expedite message authentication is able to be achieved.
V. CONCLUSION
In vehicular networks, authentication is an effective mean to guarantee network security. Revocation mechanism is employed to evict compromised vehicles from the network, which indispensable for authentication scheme. A large body of work have been proposed to design revocation mechanisms for vehicular networks. In this survey, we summarize systematically existing revocation schemes in vehicular networks. We have classified existing revocation schemes according to the location where the revocation information has been placed. By investigating these revocation schemes, we divide the whole revocation process into three stages: revocation information resolution, revocation information distribution and revocation information use. we also point out the challenging problems and key enabled techniques in each stage.
